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This paper investigates the pattern of wives’ hours disaggregated by the husband’s wage 
decile. In the US, this pattern has changed from downward-sloping to hump-shaped. We 
show that this development can be explained within a standard household model of labor 
supply when taking into account trends in assortative mating. We develop a model in which 
assortative mating determines the wage ratios within individual couples and thus the efficient 
time allocation of spouses. The economy-wide pattern of wives’ hours by the husband’s wage 
is downward-sloping for low degrees, hump-shaped for medium degrees, and upward-sloping 
for high degrees of assortative mating. A quantitative analysis of our model suggests that 
changes in the gender wage gap are responsible for the overall increase in hours worked by 
wives. By contrast, the fact that wives married to high-wage men experienced the most 
pronounced increase is a result of trends in assortative mating. 
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Hours worked of married women in the US increased substantially over
the second half of the last century. The most prominent explanation
for rising hours of wives is the closure of the gender wage gap, i.e. the
catching-up of female wages relative to men￿ s wages, see e.g. Galor and
Weil (1996), Jones, Manuelli, and McGrattan (2003), Knowles (2007),
and Attanasio, Low, and SÆnchez-Marcos (2008). According to house-
hold models of labor supply (see Chiappori 1988; Apps and Rees 1997;
Blundell, Chiappori, Magnac, and Meghir 2007), labor supply of a wife
depends on both the wife￿ s and the husband￿ s characteristics. Many
empirical studies estimate cross-wage elasticities of female labor supply
and ￿nd a signi￿cant in￿ uence of husbands￿wages on working hours of
wives, see Blau and Kahn (1997), Blundell, Duncan, and Meghir (1998),
Devereux (2004, 2007), and Morissette and Hou (2008).
In this paper, we investigate wives￿hours disaggregated by the hus-
band￿ s wage decile. Juhn and Murphy (1997) have performed an empir-
ical strati￿cation of wives￿hours by the husband￿ s wage and document
a clearly downward sloping relation for the late 1960s and for the 1970s.
Juhn and Murphy (1997) also ￿nd that the increase in hours worked
of wives over time has been strongly non-uniform among all groups of
married women, with wives of middle- and high-wage men experiencing
more pronounced increases in hours than wives married to low-wage hus-
bands. As a consequence, the pattern of wives￿hours by the husband￿ s
wage has changed from negative to hump-shaped. Similar ￿ndings are
reported by Morissette and Hou (2008) and Schwartz (2010).
Thus, a view on disaggregated labor supply of married women re-
veals the following two stylized observations. First, the pattern of wives￿
hours by the husband￿ s wage has changed from downward-sloping to
hump-shaped. Second, women married to men with high wages have
experienced the strongest increases in hours worked. This paper aims at
explaining these two empirical observations.
We highlight the role of assortative mating for understanding the
economy-wide pattern of wives￿hours by the husband￿ s wage decile. As-
sortative mating is the tendency of spouses with similar characteristics
to marry each other. The relevance of assortative mating for spouses￿
labor-supply decisions has been emphasized by Pencavel (1998) and De-
vereux (2004) who stress that, when seeking to interpret the observed
2relation between husbands￿characteristics and wives￿work decision, one
needs to take into account that husbands￿and wives￿characteristics are
usually correlated.
In this paper, we demonstrate that a standard household model of
labor supply (Chiappori 1988; Apps and Rees 1997; Blundell, Chiappori,
Magnac, and Meghir 2007) can generate the observed economy-wide pat-
tern of wives￿hours by the husband￿ s wage when one takes into account
trends in assortative mating. We measure assortative mating in terms
of wage potentials. For a low degree of assortative mating (i.e. mat-
ing is almost random), our model generates a downward-sloping pattern
of wives￿hours by the husband￿ s wage. By contrast, this pattern is
hump-shaped for more pronounced assortative mating. Thus, when the
degree of assortative mating increases, this induces a non-uniform change
in wives￿hours worked by the husband￿ s wage decile. Speci￿cally, the
increase in hours is most pronounced for women married to top-wage
husbands.
The economy-wide pattern of wives￿hours by the husband￿ s wage
can change due to two reasons: ￿rst, changes in the relation between
the husband￿ s wage and the wife￿ s labor supply at the household level
and, second, compositional e⁄ects which may arise because the fractions
of spouses marrying in di⁄erent ways changes. In our model, the relation
at the micro level is stable but the aggregated pattern of wives￿hours
by the husband￿ s wage depends on assortative mating.
Speci￿cally, patterns in hours in our model depend on the joint dis-
tribution of wages in marriages, i.e. on the marginal distributions of
gender-speci￿c wages and the association between spouses￿wages. Cou-
ples face a specialization decision with respect to market work and home
production. Within a couple, the e¢ cient time allocation depends on
the wage ratio of the two spouses. Only when the wife￿ s relative wage
is high enough, the couple opts for labor market participation of both
spouses. Conditional on participation, hours of the wife are an increasing
function of her relative wage.
To illustrate the e⁄ects of assortative mating, consider ￿rst the ex-
treme cases of perfect sorting and random mating. Under random mat-
ing, every husband is on average married to the wife earning the average
female wage independent of his own wage. Therefore, the relative wages
are on average lowest for wives married to top-wage husbands. As a con-
sequence, these wives work the fewest hours and the pattern of wives￿
3hours by the husband￿ s wage is downward-sloping.
Under perfect sorting, there exist only marriages where both wife
and husband are from the same quantile in the respective gender-speci￿c
wage distribution. Husband￿ s and wife￿ s wages are thus perfectly corre-
lated though not necessarily identical. The pattern of wives￿hours by
the husband￿ s wage will then also depend on the marginal distributions
of gender-speci￿c wages. For example, with identical gender-speci￿c
distributions and perfect sorting, the wage ratio is one in each couple.
Consequently, all wives work the same and the pattern of wives￿hours
by the husband￿ s wage is ￿ at. By contrast, when there is a gender wage
gap, the wife￿ s relative wage can also be increasing in the husband￿ s
wage. The reason is that an absolute wage gap is less important in rela-
tive terms when absolute wages of the two spouses are high. In couples
where the husband￿ s wage is relatively low, the wage gap translates into
pronounced relative wage di⁄erences between husband and wife. Since
the wife￿ s relative wage can be increasing in the husband￿ s wage, also
hours worked of the wife can be increasing in the husband￿ s wage.
We can imagine intermediate sorting as a combination of the two
extreme cases, a fraction of the population marrying randomly and a
fraction marrying in a perfectly assortative way. The resulting pattern of
wives￿hours worked by the husband￿ s wage decile is therefore a weighted
average of the patterns in the two extreme cases.
For the fraction of the population marrying in a random way, the pat-
tern of wives￿hours by the husband￿ s wage decile is downward sloping
independent of the wage gap. By contrast, for the fraction of the popula-
tion marrying in a perfectly assortative way, the pattern can be upward
sloping with the steepness depending on relative wage di⁄erences be-
tween husband and wife. The pattern is strongly increasing where wages
are low and relative wage di⁄erences are thus pronounced. The pattern
is almost ￿ at for couples with high absolute wages and thus low relative
wage di⁄erences. The resulting economy-wide pattern of wives￿hours by
the husband￿ s wage decile can therefore be hump-shaped depending on
the relative sizes of the two population groups marrying randomly and
perfectly assortatively, respectively. Trends in assortative mating thus
alter the pattern of wives￿hours by the husband￿ s wage decile observed
in the aggregate and consequently lead to a non-uniform change in hours
worked by wives.
From previous studies, there is much evidence that assortative mat-
4ing in the US has indeed become stronger over time. Most studies have
investigated assortative mating in terms of educational attainment and
found that husband and wife have become more similar with respect to
education over time, see Mare (1991), Kalmijn (1991a), Kalmijn (1991b),
Qian and Preston (1993), Pencavel (1998), Qian (1998), Schwartz and
Mare (2005), SÆnchez-Marcos (2008), and Schwartz (2010). Cancian and
Reed (1998) and Schwartz (2010) report increased assortative mating by
income. Sweeney and Cancian (2004) provide evidence for an increasing
correlation between wife￿ s wage and husband￿ s income. Herrnstein and
Murray (1994) report increased sorting by academic ability in higher
education and by intelligence. In this paper, we use data from the Cur-
rent Population Survey (CPS) to measure trends in assortative mating
in terms of wage potentials. We ￿nd strong evidence that assortative
mating in terms of wages has increased substantially over time.
To investigate whether empirically observed trends in the marginal
and joint distributions of wages imply patterns in hours that are consis-
tent with the empirical developments, we feed the observed distributions
of wages into our model. We measure the association between spouses￿
wages in terms of the number of marriages that exist between di⁄erent
deciles of the gender-speci￿c marginal wage distributions. By measuring
assortative mating in terms of wage deciles, we can disentangle changes
in the marginal distributions of husbands￿and wives￿wages from changes
in the association between spousal wages.
The data shows a closure of the gender wage gap and a clear trend
towards stronger assortative mating in terms of wages. Our empirical
investigation suggests that trends in the marginal wage distributions are
responsible for the overall increase in hours worked by wives. By con-
trast, the fact that wives married to high-wage men experienced the most
pronounced increase is primarily a result of trends in assortative mating
rather than being due to changes in the marginal wage distributions.
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. In Section 2,
we present the empirical facts on married women￿ s labor supply we aim
to explain as well as empirical evidence for increasing marital sorting
in terms of wages. Section 3 presents the theoretical model that uses
as an input the association between spousal wages to predict optimal
labor supply decisions. Section 4 provides an quantitative analysis where
we use the empirically observed joint distributions of wages. Section 5
concludes and an appendix follows.
52 Wives￿hours by the husband￿ s wage decile and
trends in assortative mating
In this section, we present the empirical facts we aim to explain. The
key observation we address is that the increase in married women￿ s labor
supply has not been uniform among all wives. We also illustrate in
this section that assortative mating in terms of wages has increased
substantially over time.
The non-uniform increase in women￿ s hours has been documented
by e.g. Juhn and Murphy (1997) and Schwartz (2010) and is illustrated
in Figure 1. The data are from the Current Population Survey (CPS)
in the US. The left panel shows average weekly hours worked of wives
married to men in the 10 deciles of the male wage distribution. The
￿gure compares two periods of time, 1975-1979 (darkly shaded bars)
and 2000-2006 (white bars). We form subperiods of more than one year
to control for business cycle e⁄ects. The sample consists of matched
husband-wife pairs of ages 30-50. Details on the data employed can be
found in Appendix A.
During the 1970s, there has been a clear downward-sloping pattern of
wives￿hours by the husband￿ s position in the wage distribution. Women
married to high-wage men tended to work less hours. In the more recent
period, this relationship has changed with wives of men in the middle
of the wage distribution working the most. Thus, the pattern of wives￿
hours by the husband￿ s wage has changed from downward-sloping to
hump-shaped.1
The right panel in Figure 1 shows the change (between the two pe-
riods) in weekly hours worked by married women disaggregated by the
husband￿ s wage decile. One can see that hours worked of wives in-
creased substantially among all groups of married women over time.
However, the increase has been strongly non-uniform across husband￿ s
wage deciles. Increases in hours have been largest for wives of middle-
and high-wage men. By contrast, the increase in labor supply was rela-
tively weak among wives of men in the low wage deciles.
The empirical facts we aim to explain can thus be summarized as
follows:
1A similar picture emerges when one considers changes in participation rates in-
stead of changes in hours worked (detailed results are available upon request).
6Figure 1: Wives￿weekly hours by the husband￿ s wage decile.
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1. The aggregate pattern of wives￿hours by the husband￿ s wage has
changed from downward-sloping to hump-shaped.
2. The increase in hours worked of wives has been strongly non-
uniform among all groups of married women, with increases in
hours of wives of middle- and high-wage men being more pro-
nounced than for wives of men married to low-wage husbands.
In this paper, we seek to explain these developments as a result of
changes in the wage structure in the economy. Speci￿cally, the aggregate
pattern of wives￿hours by the husband￿ s wage predicted by our model
will depend on the joint distribution of wages in marriages, i.e. on
the marginal distributions of gender-speci￿c wages together with the
association between spouses￿wages.
While most studies focused on assortative mating along education
levels (see e.g. Mare 1991, FernÆndez, Guner, and Knowles 2005,
Schwartz and Mare 2005, and Schwartz 2010), we consider sorting in
terms of spousal wages. Thereby we face the problem that, in the data,
we can observe an individual￿ s wage only if the person is participating
in the labor market. In our model, by contrast, wages are measures of
earnings potentials. To measure assortative mating in terms of potential
wages, we therefore have to impute wages for non-working individuals.
Our model implies that the participation decision is not random.
We therefore need to predict wages for non-working wives that would
be observed in the absence of non-participation. To do so, we use a
7Heckman (1976, 1979) selection model. The Heckman model is estimated
separately for the periods 1975-1979, 1980-1984, 1985-1989, 1990-1994,
1995-1999, and 2000-2006.2 Appendix B presents details on the wage
imputation.
When measuring assortative mating, one has to take into account
that simple correlation coe¢ cients between the absolute levels of the
variable of interest can be poor measures for describing trends in assor-
tative mating, see Mare (1991) and Hou and Myles (2007). The problem
of correlation coe¢ cients is their inability to distinguish changes in the
marginal distributions of husbands￿and wives￿wages from changes in
the association between spousal wages. For example, the correlation co-
e¢ cient between absolute wages would change in response a change in
the marginal distributions even when the association between spousal
wages were unchanged.
We overcome this problem by calculating the correlation between
husband￿ s and wife￿ s position in the respective gender-speci￿c wage dis-
tribution, rather than between the absolute levels of their wages. Specif-
ically, we consider the association between spouses￿decile positions in
the gender-speci￿c wage distributions. At each point in time, there are
10% of individuals of a given gender in each wage decile independent of
the wages earned in the speci￿c decile. Thus, the distribution of decile
positions is by construction constant over time. Changes in the cor-
relation between these relative positions of husband and wife therefore
re￿ ect changes in assortative mating.3
Figure 2 shows the change in the correlation coe¢ cient between hus-
band￿ s and wife￿ s wage decile positions over time for di⁄erent approaches
to handle the missing-data problem. Both for simple regression-based
and Heckman-based imputation, respectively, there is a pronounced and
steady increase in the correlation coe¢ cient between spousal wage decile
positions. In fact, the correlation coe¢ cient almost doubles from 1975-
2To check for robustness, we also consider alternative ways to handle the missing-
data problem. A ￿rst strategy is to delete the entire couple from the sample if one of
the spouses￿wages is not observed. We refer to this speci￿cation as ￿ listwise deletion￿ .
A second strategy is to use wage predictions from simple OLS estimates.
3An alternative approach to disentangle changes in the association from changes
in the marginal wage distributions is to estimate a crossings model, see e.g. Mare
(1991) and Schwartz (2010). An advantage of measuring assortative mating in terms
of wage decile positions is that this association has a structural interpretation and
can be used directly as an input in our model later on.
8Figure 2: Correlation coe¢ cient between spousal wage decile positions.


























79 to 2000-06. When we abstain from imputing wages and restrict the
sample to couples were both husband and wife are participating, we ￿nd
a similar development with a marked increase in the wage correlation
between 1975-79 and 1995-99.
It is instructive to investigate in more detail the joint distribution of
spousal wage decile positions. This allows us to see in which areas of the
distribution the association between husband￿ s and wife￿ s wage decile
positions has become stronger over time. We summarize the association
between spousal wages by a 10￿10 association matrix S containing the
observed frequencies of the 100 possible combinations of spouses￿wage
deciles. Entry sij in this matrix gives the fraction of marriages in which
the husband belongs to the i￿ th decile of the male wage distribution




























































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































10To highlight changes over time, Table 1 shows the relative changes











ij , using the Heckman-
imputed wages for non-working wives.4 Positive values indicate that in
2000-06 the number of couples with the speci￿c combination of wage
deciles has increased relative to 1975-79. Tables 5 and 6 in Appendix C
show the association matrices separately for the two periods of time.
From Table 1 it can be seen that the number of couples where hus-
band and wife di⁄er by much with respect to their relative positions in
the respective wage distributions has decreased substantially. For ex-
ample, the number of couples where the husband is from the top decile
of the male distribution and the wife is from the lowest decile of the
female distribution has decreased by about 30%. In general, Table 1
shows a clear pattern that most entries distant from the main diagonal
are negative. By contrast, decile combinations on and close to the main
diagonal tend to be observed more often, highlighting that couples have
become more similar in terms of gender-speci￿c wage positions.
These results show that assortative mating in terms of wages has
increased substantially over time. In the next section, we present a
theoretical model that highlights the role of changes in the wage struc-
ture for explaining the non-uniform increase in hours worked by married
women and the resulting change in wives￿hours worked disaggregated
by the husband￿ s wage decile.
3 The model
3.1 Decision problem of a couple
We consider an economy populated by couples which di⁄er by the wages
of the two spouses. First, we will present the decision process for indi-
vidual couples. Thereafter, we will aggregate their decisions.
A couple consists of two spouses. We denote spouses￿wages by w1
and w2 and order spouses by these wages such that the index i = 1
refers to the primary earner and i = 2 to the secondary earner. Note
that the index does not necessarily refer to the gender of the respective
spouse. For the decisions at the couple level, gender is not relevant. For
instance, labor-force participation of the secondary earner will depend
4Results using OLS-imputed wages and from listwise deletion are very similar.
11on his or her relative wage independent of gender.
There are two commodities in the model, a private "market" con-
sumption good and a "home" consumption good that is public to the
couple. We assume that individuals￿preferences over the two commodi-
ties are characterized by the additively separable utility function
ui = lnci +   lnd, (1)
where ci denotes consumption of the market good and d stands for con-
sumption of the home or domestic good. d does not wear an index
indicating an individual since the home good is public.
Market goods can be earned through market labor by both spouses.
We denote the time spent on market work by ni. The couple￿ s budget
constraint is thus given by
c1 + c2 = w1 ￿ n1 + w2 ￿ n2. (2)
Home goods are produced within the household using both spouses￿
labor (denoted by h1 and h2, respectively) as inputs with a production
function f (h1;h2) = (h1)
1=2 (h2)
1=2. Correspondingly, the home con-




We impose equal exponents on both labor inputs. A priori, there is there-
fore no di⁄erence between the two spouses￿labor in home production.
However, the household can decide to use the two inputs in di⁄erent
quantities depending on opportunity costs.
Both spouses have a time endowment of 1 which can be used for
market work and home production, i.e.
ni + hi = 1; i = 1;2. (4)
The couple chooses the time allocations of both spouses and the
distribution of the resulting consumption possibilities. Thus the couple
chooses h1, h2, n1, n2, d, c1, and c2. Constraints are given by equations
(2) to (4).
While the distribution of market consumption is subject to the spe-
ci￿c process of household bargaining, we can determine the time alloca-
tions by e¢ ciency considerations alone. Since the focus of this paper is
12on labor-supply decisions, we do not need to specify a household bar-
gaining process. For our purposes, it is su¢ cient to assume that the
outcome of the bargaining process is e¢ cient.
3.2 Decision making
In collective models of household behavior, households are assumed to al-
locate their resources e¢ ciently (Chiappori 1988; Chiappori 1992). Con-
sequently, given a desired amount of home consumption, the household
will produce it with minimal opportunity costs. Given the desired level
of home consumption, the cost minimization determines time spent in
home production for both spouses. In our set-up, spouses spend their
remaining time on paid market work. Accordingly, we proceed by solv-
ing for a family￿ s optimal level of home consumption and then deduce
labor-supply decisions.
For e¢ ciency, the marginal costs to produce the public home good
(in terms of foregone market consumption) has to be equal to the sum
of both spouses marginal rates of substitution which corresponds to
Samuelson￿ s (1955) rule for e¢ cient public-good provision,
MRS1 (c1;d) + MRS2 (c2;d) = MC (d), (5)




@d is spouse i￿ s marginal rate of substitution
between home and market goods. MC (d) denotes the marginal costs of
home production for the couple in terms of market goods. In order to
determine the optimal level of home consumption which satis￿es (5), we
need to consider the couples￿marginal costs of producing the home good
as well as spouses￿marginal rates of substitution. Detailed derivations
of decisions at the couple level can be found in Appendix D.1.
Marginal costs of home consumption. The marginal cost function
MC (d) results from the production of d units of the home good with
minimal costs. In this minimization problem, the household has to re-




In e¢ cient allocations, total opportunity costs of home production as a





subject to the home production function (3) and the two time constraints
(6) and (7). Technically, marginal costs are the derivative of this value
function.
Due to the inequality restrictions (6) and (7), the marginal cost func-
tion is not globally di⁄erentiable. In the range where (6) and (7) do not
bind, production of the home good exhibits constant marginal costs due
to the constant returns to scale property of the production function.
Marginal costs in this range are given by 2 ￿ (w1)
1=2 ￿ (w2)
1=2. The cost-











The couple can only produce with constant returns to scale and thus
with constant marginal costs as long as both spouses can still increase
their time spent in home production. From the point where one spouse
spends her or his entire time endowment in home production, further
increases in home production can only be realized by increases in the
other spouse￿ s time input. Since w1 > w2, the time constraint of the






. From there on, marginal costs are given by the inverse
of the primary earner￿ s marginal productivity multiplied by his or her
wage. Since h2 = 1 in this range, the marginal productivity of the
primary earner is given by 1
2 (h1)






amount of h1 to produce d is h1 = d2. Marginal costs are therefore
2 ￿ w1 ￿ d in this range. Since both spouses￿time endowments are 1,
the maximum quantity of home consumption is 1. The marginal cost
function (in terms of foregone market consumption) is thus given by
MC (d) =
8
> > > <
> > > :
2 ￿ (w1)
1=2 ￿ (w2)










< d < 1
1; d > 1.
(8)
14The corresponding total (opportunity) cost function is
C (d) =
8
> > > <
> > > :
2 ￿ (w1)
1=2 ￿ (w2)










< d < 1
1; d > 1.
(9)
Sum of the marginal rates of substitution. We now turn to the
spouses￿marginal rates of substitution between market and home con-
sumption. The marginal rates of substitution depend on spouses￿indi-
vidual marginal utility of market consumption. The couples￿ s marginal
willingness to pay will therefore in general depend on the intra-couple
distribution of private consumption which is subject to bargaining. With
log utility, however, intra-household bargaining does not a⁄ect the cou-
ple￿ s willingness to pay for home consumption. Since the marginal rates
of substitution are linear with this speci￿c formulation of utility and the
home good is public, marginal rates of substitution can be added up
to a function of the couple￿ s total consumption levels of the two goods
independent of the distribution across spouses. In particular, it holds
that
MRS1 (c1;d) + MRS2 (c2;d) =   ￿
c1
d
+   ￿
c2
d




where c = c1 + c2. Redistributing private consumption lowers one
spouses￿ s marginal rate of substitution but increases the other spouse￿ s
one by the same amount. Changes in the distribution of private con-
sumption within the couple therefore do not a⁄ect the sum of the two
marginal rates of substitution.
With e¢ cient production of the home good, the constraints (2), (3),
and (4) can be combined to
w1 + w2 = c + C (d).
Thus, the choice of either c or d determines the other as well. The
couple￿ s total level of market consumption, c, can then be expressed as
c = w1 + w2 ￿ C (d). We can therefore express the sum of the two
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w1+w2
d ￿ 2  (w1)
1=2 ￿ (w2)










< d < 1
￿1; d > 1
(11)
3.3 Labor-supply decisions
By the condition for e¢ cient provision of the public good (5), the optimal
level of home consumption is at the intersection of (8) and (11). Labor-
market participation of the secondary earner will depend on whether or
not the couple wishes a level of home consumption that can be produced
without using the entire time endowment of the secondary earner. Tech-






. We can thus derive a participation condition on
the secondary earner￿ s wage relative to the primary earner￿ s one. The





The secondary earner only participates in the labor market if his or
her relative contribution to the couple￿ s potential income exceeds some
threshold value determined by the valuation of home consumption. The
higher the wage of the primary earner, the higher the wage of the sec-
ondary earner has to be for participation of both spouses.




2 +  
￿
 





and the primary earner￿ s hours are
n1 =
2
2 +  
￿
 





If the secondary earner does not participate, the primary earner works
constant hours on the market, given by
n1 =
2
2 +  
. (15)
16Note that none of the labor-supply decisions described by equations
(12) to (15) depend on the absolute wage of one of the two spouses.
Instead, all decisions depend on the wage ratio between the two spouses
within the couple.
Now we consider a couple with a wife F and husband M, whose wages
are denoted by wF and wM, respectively. The wife is the secondary
earner if wF < wM and vice versa. Summarizing labor-supply decisions
at the couple level as described by equations (12) to (15), we can express














2+  ￿ !￿1;
 
2 ￿ ! < 2
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2+ ; ! ￿ 2
 
. (16)
We impose the parameter restriction
  < 2
such that there are wage ratios for which both, husband and wife, par-
ticipate in the labor market, see equation (16).
3.4 The role of assortative mating
We now illustrate the in￿ uence of the mating structure on the aggregate
pattern of wives￿labor supply. In the next section, we aggregate indi-
vidual decisions formally to obtain the aggregate pattern of wives￿hours
by the husband￿ s wage predicted by our model.
Equation (16) describes the relation between the husband￿ s wage
and the wife￿ s labor supply at the household level. This relation is
negative and independent of the mating structure. By contrast, the
aggregate pattern of wives￿hours by the husband￿ s wage also depends
on assortative mating because assortative mating a⁄ects the aggregation
of individual decisions.
Figure 3 illustrates the relation between wife￿ s hours and the wages
of the two spouses in the couple given by equation (16). The ￿gure
shows some selected iso-hours lines where darker colors correspond to
more hours of the wife. The dark gray area in the upper left part of the
￿gure contains couples who decide that only the wife works for pay. In
17Figure 3: Wives￿hours of market work for di⁄erent husband-wife wage
combinations (iso-hours lines and areas, resp.; the darker, the more
hours) and two joint distributions of wages with identical marginal dis-
tributions (scenario 1: imperfect sorting (non-￿lled circles); scenario 2:






man 1 man 2 man 3
the light gray area in the lower right corner of the ￿gure, wives do not
participate in the labor market. Between these two areas, hours of wives
continuously decrease from the upper left to the lower right as the wife￿ s
relative wage decreases.
The circles in the ￿gure indicate couples with di⁄erent husband-wife
wage combinations. We illustrate the role of assortative mating on the
aggregate pattern of labor supply using these couples as examples. We
consider three women and three men who are matched to each other in
two di⁄erent ways. Across scenarios, the gender-speci￿c marginal distri-
butions of wages are identical but the joint distribution of spousal wages
di⁄ers. In scenario 1 (non-￿lled circles), marital sorting is imperfect
while it is perfect in scenario 2 (￿lled circles). Marital sorting is perfect
in the second scenario as the woman with the highest potential wage
(woman 3) is married to the man with the highest wage (man 3), and
so on.
18First note that, in the example, the increase in assortative mating
alters the aggregate participation rate. In scenario 1, the couple in the
lower right of the ￿gure (woman 1 and man 3) decides against labor-
market participation of the wife. Intra-household wage di⁄erentials are
su¢ ciently pronounced that it is rational to use the wife￿ s time solely
in home production. In the other two couples, both spouses participate
on the labor market. The aggregate participation rate of wives is 2/3 in
this scenario.
In scenario 2 (￿lled circles), although the marginal distributions of
wages have not changed, the aggregate participation rate is 1. Sorting
is perfect in this scenario, i.e. the top-wage wife is matched with the
top-wage husband and so on. As a consequence, in the example, there is
no more couple where intra-household wage di⁄erentials are su¢ ciently
large for husband-only participation.
Changes in assortative mating a⁄ect the aggregate pattern of wives￿
hours worked by the husband￿ s wage positions. In scenario 1, the wife
married to the husband with the highest wage (man 3) works the fewest
hours while the other two women work the same. In scenario 2, this
pattern is ￿ ipped upside down with the wife married to the top-wage
husband supplying the most labor and the other two women working
the same.
3.5 Aggregate pattern of wives￿hours by the hus-
band￿ s wage positions
We now use our model for a strati￿cation analysis as performed in Sec-
tion 2 for the CPS data. Speci￿cally, we study the aggregate pattern of
wives￿hours by the husband￿ s wage predicted by our model for di⁄erent
forms of assortative mating.
We can use the joint distribution of wages in marriages as an input to
our model, i.e. the marginal distributions of gender-speci￿c wages and
the association between spouses￿wages. We allow for the possibility that
the marginal distributions are not the same across genders. Speci￿cally,
we allow for a gender wage gap. To highlight the role of changes in the
association between husband￿ s and wife￿ s wages, we consider uniform
marginal distributions in the theoretical part of the paper. In the next
section, we feed the empirically observed marginal and joint distributions
of wages into our model.
19In general, marginal distributions may di⁄er by gender. With a gen-
der wage gap, the wage of the representative man in the i￿ th decile of the
male distribution, WM (i); is higher than the wage of the representative
woman in the i￿ th decile of the female distribution, WF (i). We denote
the absolute di⁄erence between gender-speci￿c wages by ￿ and assume
here that this wage gap is constant across deciles.
We normalize the marginal distribution of female wages so that its
support has length 1, i.e. female wages are distributed uniformly on
(wmin;wmin + 1) with wmin ￿ 0. Correspondingly, male wages are dis-








which ensures that in a couple where both husband and wife earn the
lowest gender-speci￿c wages, respectively, the wife participates in the la-
bor market. It furthermore implies that, whenever husband and wife are
at the same quantile of the respective wage distributions, both spouses
participate.
We model assortative mating similar as in Kremer (1997). It is as-
sumed that a proportion ￿ of agents marries a spouse from the same
wage quantile whereas everyone else marries randomly. Perfect sorting
and random mating are special cases where ￿ = 1 or ￿ = 0, respectively.
For a husband with wage wM, the probability of being married to a wife
with wage wF = wM ￿￿ is ￿ while all other wages of the wife are equally
likely with a total probability of 1 ￿ ￿.
The economy-wide pattern of wives￿hours by the husband￿ s wage
positions results from (i) the relation between the husband￿ s wage and
the wife￿ s labor supply at the household level described by equation
(16) and (ii) the mating structure in the economy. To determine the
aggregate pattern, we calculate average hours of wives married to hus-
bands earning a certain wage wM. We do so by integrating individ-








￿f (wF j wM) dwF, where nF (wM) denotes aver-
age hours worked of wives married to husbands earning a wage wM. The
densities f (wF j wM) depend on assortative mating. Given the marginal
and joint distributions of wages, average hours of wives married to hus-
20bands earning a wage wM are
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fraction marrying perfectly assortatively, both participate
which evaluates as (see Appendix D.2)
nF (wM) = ￿ + (1 ￿ ￿) ￿ g (wM) + ￿ ￿ k (wM), (18)
where ￿ = 2
2+  + (1 ￿ ￿) ￿ 2
2+  ￿ wmin and
g (wM)=￿
 
















Wives￿ hours by the husband￿ s wage are thus a constant plus the
weighted sum of two functions of the husband￿ s wage. g (wM) is a down-
ward sloping and linear function while k (wM) is an upward sloping and
concave function for ￿ > 0 and a constant for ￿ = 0. The weights for
g (wM) and k (wM) are determined by the parameter ￿ measuring the
degree of assortative mating. The pattern of wives￿hours by the hus-
band￿ s wage decile thus depends on the degree of assortative mating and
the gender wage gap.
Figure 4 illustrates the pattern of wives￿hours by the husband￿ s wage
deciles for six di⁄erent scenarios. To illustrate the possible patterns, we
21Figure 4: Patterns of wives￿hours by husbands￿wage deciles for di⁄er-
ent degrees of assortative mating (illustration using uniform marginal
distributions).





























































































































































































































22use example parameter values.5 When we compare model predictions
to empirical observations in the next section, we use the empirically
observed marginal and joint distributions of wages.
Here, we distinguish between two cases concerning the wage gap
(￿ = 0, ￿ > 0) and three di⁄erent degrees of assortative mating (￿ = 1,
￿ = 0, 0 < ￿ < 1). The left column in Figure 4 refers to the case of no
wage gap (￿ = 0), while the right column shows the results when a wage
gap is present (￿ > 0). The rows in Figure 4 refer to the three cases of
assortative mating (perfect sorting, random mating, intermediate sort-
ing).
Consider the case of perfect assortative mating, ￿ = 1, which is
illustrated in the ￿rst row of Figure 4. In this situation, there exist only
marriages where both wife and husband are from the same quantile in
the respective gender-speci￿c wage distribution.
Without a gender wage gap, ￿ = 0, this implies that the wage ratio
in each couple is !j = 1. Consequently, all wives work the same, which
can be seen from equation (18) for ￿ = 1 and ￿ = 0,
nF (wM) = ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿
 
2 +  
.
This case is illustrated in the upper left panel of Figure 4.
By contrast, when there is a gender wage gap, ￿ > 0, the average
wage ratio, (wM ￿ ￿)=wM, is increasing in the husband￿ s wage. As a
consequence, with a gender wage gap and perfect assortative mating,
average hours worked by wives are increasing in the husband￿ s wage.
This is illustrated in the upper right panel of Figure 4 and can be seen
from equation (18) for ￿ = 1 and ￿ > 0:
nF (wM) = ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿
 





In the other extreme case, ￿ = 0, mating is completely random.
Here, all possible combinations of wages within a marriage exist with
5For the ￿gure, the parameter   measuring the valuation of home consumption
is set to 0:5 and the marginal distribution of female wages is uniform on [0:1;1:1],
thus wmin = 0:1. For the cases with a gender wage gap (right column), we set
￿ = 0:3, otherwise ￿ = 0. The parameter ￿ measuring the degree of assortative
mating is 1 (￿rst row), 0 (second row), or 0:5 (third row), respectively. The weekly
time endowment is set to 40 hours.
23same frequency. Hence, every husband is on average married to the
wife earning the average female wage wF independent of his own wage
position. Therefore, the average wage ratio wF=wM is decreasing across
the male wage distribution. As can be seen from equation (18) for ￿ =
0, this results in a downward-sloping pattern of wives￿hours by the
husband￿ s wage, independent of the wage gap,
nF (wM) = ￿ ￿
 









This case is illustrated in the second row of Figure 4.
The third row of Figure 4 represents an intermediate case of assor-
tative mating where ￿ = 0:5. In this intermediate case, both functions
g (wM) and k (wM) are given non-zero weights in equation (18). For
￿ = 0, wives￿hours by the husband￿ s decile are then the sum of a down-
ward sloping function and a constant,
nF (wM) = ￿ ￿ (1 ￿ ￿) ￿
 








￿ wM ￿ ￿ ￿
 
2 +  
,
and thus downward sloping in the male wage, see the lower left panel of
Figure 4. In the presence of a gender wage gap, ￿ > 0, female hours by
male wage decile are the sum of a downward sloping linear function and
a concave upward sloping function,
nF (wM) = ￿￿(1 ￿ ￿)￿
 
















The function nF (wM) is thus concave and can be hump-shaped, depend-
ing on the speci￿c value for ￿. In Appendix D.3, we show that for any
combination of the parameters  , wmin, and ￿ > 0, there exists a degree
of assortative mating, ￿, such that the pattern of wives￿hours by the
husband￿ s wage is hump-shaped.
The role of assortative mating for the pattern of wives￿hours by the
husband￿ s wage becomes apparent when comparing the three panels in
the right column of Figure 4. In all three scenarios, the marginal distri-
butions of gender-speci￿c wages are identical. However, the patterns in
wives￿hours di⁄er depending on the association between spouses￿wages.
244 Quantitative analysis
The analysis in the previous section has shown that our model is able
to generate the empirical patterns documented in Section 2: The aggre-
gate pattern of wives￿hours by the husband￿ s wage has been downward-
sloping in 1975-79 like in the middle row of Figure 4. In 2000-06 this
pattern has changed to being hump-shaped as in the lower right panel
of Figure 4.
The patterns in hours predicted by the model depend on the joint
distribution of wages in marriages, i.e. on the marginal distributions of
gender-speci￿c wages and the association between spouses￿wages. We
now feed the empirically observed joint distributions of wages into our
model and investigate whether observed trends in these distributions
imply patterns in hours that are consistent with the empirical develop-
ments.
As in Section 2, we measure the association in terms of the number
of marriages that exist between di⁄erent deciles of the gender-speci￿c
marginal wage distributions. The 10 ￿ 10 association matrix S intro-
duced in Section 2 contains the relative frequencies of the 100 possible
combinations of deciles in a marriage. As discussed in Section 2, the as-
sociation between husband￿ s and wife￿ s wage has changed towards more
pronounced assortative mating.
Since we consider deciles, all columns (and all rows) in S contain 10
percent of the overall population. By construction, our analysis in terms
of wage deciles controls for changes in the marginal gender-speci￿c wage
distributions that could otherwise distort the measurement of changes
in assortative mating. Put di⁄erently, by measuring assortative mating
in terms of wage deciles, we can disentangle changes in the marginal dis-
tributions of husband￿ s and wife￿ s wages from changes in the association
between spousal wages.
The gender-speci￿c mean wage levels associated with the deciles are
denoted by WF (i) and WM (i), respectively, where i is a decile number.
Table 2 shows the marginal distributions of spousal wages for the two
periods of time we consider, 1975-79 and 2000-06. For both genders,
wages have increased over time whereas the increase has been stronger
for women. The gender wage gap closed by 12 percentage points on
average over all deciles. The table also shows that changes in wages and



































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































26For both genders, wages in the upper deciles have grown stronger than
wages in the lower deciles. Similarly, the closure of the gender wage gap
has been strongest in the upper half of the wage distribution.
Finally, we have to choose a value for the parameter   measuring the
valuation of home consumption and a value for the weekly time endow-
ment. We set the relative valuation of home consumption to   = 0:5,
a value in the range commonly used in the literature for comparable
utility functions, see e.g. Jones, Manuelli, and McGrattan (2003). This
value implies that the ratio of time spent on home production and time
spent on market work is about 60%, which is in line with empirical ￿nd-
ings. For instance, McGrattan, Rogerson, and Wright (1997) estimate a
household utility function with home production and their results imply
that the ratio of home to market hours is 15=27. The weekly time en-
dowment has a pure scaling e⁄ect on labor supply and is set to 40 hours.
The weekly time endowment is the total working time of agents in our
model since leisure is absent from the model.
To calculate the economy-wide pattern of wives￿hours by the hus-
band￿ s wage decile predicted by our model for a given joint distribution
of wages fWF;WM;Sg, we proceed as follows. We ￿rst determine fe-
male labor supply for all 100 possible combinations of decile positions
in a 10 ￿ 10 matrix H: To determine hours worked by the wife hij in a
speci￿c cell ij we plug the ratio of gender-speci￿c average wages in this
cell, !ij = WF (j)=WM (i), into equation (16). Average hours worked




where hi is the i￿ th row of the female hours matrix H and si is the
corresponding row in the association matrix S.
Figure 5 shows wives￿hours by the husband￿ s wage decile predicted
by our model when we use the empirically observed marginal and joint
distributions of spousal wages in 1975-79 and 2000-06, respectively. The
right panel shows the relative change in married women￿ s hours by the
husband￿ s wage decile between the two periods. Thus, the ￿gure is the
model￿ s counterpart to the strati￿cation analysis performed using CPS
hours displayed in Figure 1.
For 1975-79, the model predicts a decreasing pattern of wives￿hours
by the husband￿ s wage decile as observed in the data. For 2000-06, the
model predicts a higher level of hours worked by wives. From the right
panel of the ￿gure, one can see that the predicted increase in hours
is not uniform across husband￿ s wage deciles. As in the data, wives
27Figure 5: Predicted wife￿ s weekly hours by husband￿ s wage decile.
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married to high-wage men experience the strongest increases. However,
the increase is not su¢ ciently non-uniform to change the pattern in the
left panel from downward sloping to hump-shaped.
The patterns in Figure 5 result from e⁄ects of changes in the mar-
ginal distributions of gender-speci￿c wages as well as from e⁄ects due to
changes in the association of spousal wages. To disentangle these e⁄ects,
we perform a series of counterfactual experiments. Figure 6 summarizes
the results. Each panel in the ￿gure corresponds to a di⁄erent counter-
factual setting and shows the change in wives￿hours by the husband￿ s
decile (the ￿gures are thus the analogs to the right panel in Figure 5).
In a ￿rst experiment, we hold constant the association matrix S at its
1975-79 level but allow the marginal distributions to change over time.
This way, we shut down e⁄ects of trends in assortative mating. From the
upper left panel in Figure 6 it can be seen that, when we do not allow for
change in assortative mating, the model does predict an increase in hours
for all groups of wives. Yet, in this scenario, the increase is strongest for
wives married to medium-wage men. By contrast, the data show that
wives married to high-wage men have experienced the strongest increases
in hours worked.
The upper right panel in Figure 6 refers to the other extreme case
where we allow for changes in the association between spousal wages but
hold constant the gender-speci￿c marginal wage distributions. In this
scenario, changes in wives￿hours are increasing in the husband￿ s decile
28Figure 6: Counterfactual experiments.
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29position. Yet, not all groups of wives experience increasing hours in this
scenario.
This evaluation of our model suggests that changes in the marginal
wage distributions are responsible for the overall increase in hours worked
by wives. By contrast, the fact that wives married to high-wage men
experienced the most pronounced increase is a result of trends in assor-
tative mating rather than being due to changes in the marginal distrib-
utions.
A potential source of the non-uniform increase in hours is that the
gender wage gap has closed in a non-uniform way. As we used the empir-
ically observed marginal gender-speci￿c wage distributions, our bench-
mark results reported in Figure 5 include the e⁄ects of the non-uniform
wage-gap closure. In order to study the role of this development, we per-
form two additional counterfactual experiments. In these experiments,
we impose a uniform closure of the wage gap, i.e. we impose that the
wage gap has closed by the same amount (measured in percentage points)
across all deciles.
The lower left panel in Figure 6 refers to the case where the wage
gap closes in such uniform way and the association is held constant at
its 1975-79 level. The lower right panel also imposes a neutral wage-gap
closure but additionally allows for changes in assortative mating over
time. The e⁄ects of the non-neutrality of the wage gap closure become
apparent when comparing the upper left and the lower left panels in the
￿gure. With a uniform closure of the wage gap, the model predicts de-
creasing hours for wives of top-wage men, opposed to what is observed
in the data. However, one can see that accounting for trends in assorta-
tive mating is key for understanding the non-uniform increase in wive￿ s
hours. Only when we allow the association matrix to change over time,
our model predicts an increasing pattern in the change of hours worked
by women as observed in the data.
5 Conclusion
This paper has investigated wives￿hours disaggregated by the husband￿ s
wage decile. Speci￿cally, we have addressed two empirical observations
that have been documented for the US. First, the aggregate pattern
of wives￿hours by the husband￿ s wage has changed from downward-
sloping to hump-shaped. Second, over time, the increase in hours worked
30of wives has been strongly non-uniform among all groups of married
women, with increases in hours of wives of middle- and high-wage men
being more pronounced than for wives of men married to low-wage hus-
bands.
We have presented a theoretical model that explicitly considers the
role of assortative mating in terms of wages for understanding these
developments. Assortative mating determines the wage ratios within in-
dividual couples. In our model, the intra-couple wage ratio determines
the e¢ cient time allocation of the two spouses. Only when the wife￿ s rel-
ative wage is high enough, the couple opts for labor-market participation
of both spouses.
Under random mating, every husband is on average married to the
wife earning the average female wage independent of his own wage.
Therefore, the relative wages are lowest for wives married to top-wage
husbands. As a consequence, these wives work the fewest hours. Under
random mating, the pattern of wives￿hours by the husband￿ s wage decile
is therefore negative.
Under perfect sorting, by contrast, there exist only marriages where
both wife and husband are from the same quantile in the respective
gender-speci￿c wage distribution. The pattern of wives￿hours by the
husband￿ s wage will then also depend on the marginal distributions of
gender-speci￿c wages. When there is a gender wage gap, the wife￿ s
relative wage can be increasing in the husband￿ s wage. As a consequence,
hours worked by the wife can be increasing in the husband￿ s wage.
For intermediate sorting, the resulting pattern of wives￿hours worked
by the husband￿ s wage decile is a weighted average of the patterns in
the two extreme cases of random and perfect mating, respectively. The
resulting economy-wide pattern of wive￿ s hours by the husband￿ s wage
decile can therefore be hump-shaped depending on the relative weights
of population groups marrying randomly and perfectly assortatively, re-
spectively. Changes in assortative mating thus alter the pattern of wives￿
hours worked by the husband￿ s wage decile and consequently lead to a
non-uniform change in hours worked by wives.
The patterns in hours predicted by our model depend on the joint
distribution of wages in marriages. In a quantitative analysis, we have
fed the empirically observed joint distributions of wages into our model
and have investigated whether observed changes in these distributions
imply patterns in hours that are consistent with the empirical develop-
31ments.
The data shows a closure of the gender wage gap and a clear trend
towards stronger assortative mating in terms of wages. For 1975-79, the
model predicts a decreasing pattern of wives￿hours by the husband￿ s
wage decile as observed in the data. For 2000-06, the model predicts
a higher overall level of hours worked by wives. In accordance with
empirical developments, the model-predicted increase in hours is not
uniform across husband￿ s wage deciles. As in the data, wives married to
high-wage men experience the strongest increases. However, the increase
is not su¢ ciently non-uniform to change the pattern of wives￿hours by
the husband￿ s wage from downward sloping to hump-shaped.
A series of counterfactual experiments has shown that changes in
the marginal wage distributions are responsible for the overall increase
in hours worked by wives. By contrast, the fact that wives married to
high-wage men experienced the most pronounced increase is a result of
trends in assortative mating rather than being due to changes in the
marginal wage distributions. Thus, accounting for trends in assortative
mating is key for understanding the non-uniform increase in wives￿hours.
Only when we take into account trends in assortative mating, our model
predicts an increasing pattern in the change of hours worked by women
as observed in the data.
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Appendix
A CPS data
The CPS data we use are in the format arranged by Unicon Research.6
The CPS is a monthly household survey conducted by the Bureau of
the Census. Respondents are interviewed to obtain information about
the employment status of each member of the household 16 years of age
and older. Survey questions covering hours of work, earnings, gender,
and marital status are covered in the Annual Social Economic Supple-
ment, the so-called March Supplement Files. The sample of the CPS is
representative of the civilian non-institutional population.
Data on hours and earnings is retrospective and refers to the previous
year. The CPS data we use covers the period 1975-2006. While the CPS
provides data on hours and earnings from 1963 onwards, the number of
children in family under age six is not available before 1975. Since the
latter variable is used as an instrument for imputing wages for non-
working individuals, our analysis starts in 1975.
6See http://www.unicon.com/.
35Our selected sample comprises civilians aged 30 to 50. In a set of
robustness tests, we checked that our results are robust with respect to
the speci￿c age range (detailed results are available on request). We
drop people who derive their main income from self-employment and
consider only couples where both husband and wife are present in the
sample. We identify spouses by the household identi￿cation number. To
control for outliers, we drop couples where either husband or wife fall in
the top 1% percentile of observed wages.
In 1992, the educational-attainment question in the CPS changed
from years of education to degree receipt. Following Jaeger (1997), we
harmonized both series and created a measure of educational attainment
that takes on four categories: dropouts, high-school graduates, some col-
lege, and college graduates.7
B Wage imputation
Since our dataset is very large, we use Heckman￿ s (1979) two-step
e¢ cient estimator instead of Maximum likelihood estimation (see
Wooldridge 2002 for technical details). The Heckman two-step model
can be described as follows. First, we estimate a binomial probit model
that predicts the individual￿ s probability of participation in the labor
market (selection equation). Second, we use the estimated selection
model to construct the hazard rate for sample inclusion. Third, we in-
clude the hazard rate as a regressor in the wage equation. When the
error term in the selection equation is correlated with the error term
in the wage equation, standard regression techniques yield inconsistent
estimates while the two-step Heckman procedure yields consistent esti-
mates.
To identify the Heckman model, we need to ￿nd factors that deter-
mine whether a wife participates in the labor market but are unrelated to
a wife￿ s wage. We assume that the likelihood of working is a function of
the number of preschool children at home (we code the number of kids
as dummy variables). Moreover, we include in the selection equation
quadratic terms in age of wife and husband and the levels of education
of both partners. The number of preschool children and the characteris-
tics of the husband are only included in the participation equation but
7This education variable has been created from the CPS variables _educ (1964-
1991, 19 categories, Unicon recoded) and grdatn (1992-2007, 17 categories).
361975-1979 2000-2006
Wage equation estimate std. err. estimate std. err.
log(age wife/17) -0.054 0.149 1.182 0.116
log(age wife/17) squared 0.038 0.103 -0.592 0.077
education level 2 wife 0.156 0.011 0.385 0.014
education level 3 wife 0.257 0.013 0.600 0.014
education level 4 wife 0.495 0.014 0.975 0.014
intercept 1.938 0.056 1.035 0.047
year dummies included
Participation equation
log(age wife/17) 0.105 0.280 0.338 0.235
log(age wife/17) squared -0.390 0.193 -0.172 0.157
log(age husband/17) -1.493 0.301 -0.797 0.256
log(age husband/17) squared 0.843 0.198 0.416 0.164
education level 2 wife 0.306 0.015 0.501 0.019
education level 3 wife 0.451 0.020 0.712 0.019
education level 4 wife 0.769 0.022 0.928 0.021
education level 2 husband -0.051 0.015 0.190 0.018
education level 3 husband -0.070 0.019 0.181 0.019
education level 4 husband -0.232 0.019 -0.111 0.020
2 kids younger than age 6 -0.655 0.013 -0.443 0.011
3 kids younger than age 6 -1.041 0.020 -0.733 0.015
4 kids younger than age 6 -1.332 0.051 -1.131 0.037
5 kids younger than age 6 -1.765 0.173 -1.392 0.131
intercept 0.626 0.090 0.215 0.088
year dummies included
￿ (inv. Mills ratio) -0.017 0.018 0.295 0.018
Table 3: Two-step Estimates of Heckman Selection Model
Method Obs. Mean Std. Dev. Min Max
1975-1979 Heckman 64090 2.070 0.158 1.790 2.419
OLS 64090 2.057 0.159 1.774 2.408
2000-2006 Heckman 94352 2.183 0.307 1.376 2.618
OLS 94352 2.334 0.277 1.665 2.729
Table 4: Predictions of Heckman Selection Model vs. OLS imputation
37are omitted from the wage equation. We also control for time e⁄ects.
In the wage equation, we include a quadratic term in the wife￿ s age
and dummy variables for the wife￿ s level of education. By including all
variables that determine the wage also in the participation equation, we
allow the participation decision to depend implicitly on the wage.
We ￿t the Heckman model separately for the periods 1975-1979 and
2000-2006. Table 3 summarizes the two-step estimates of the Heckman
selection model. The upper part of the table displays the estimates
for the parameters in the wage equation while the lower part shows
the results for the participation equation. In both equations, we have
included time dummies but their point estimates are omitted from the
table to save on space.
From the selection equation, it can be seen that more preschool chil-
dren in the household signi￿cantly decrease the probability of participa-
tion. The coe¢ cient of the selection term is reported at the bottom of
Table 1. While the selection term is found to be insigni￿cant in 1975-
1979 it turns highly signi￿cant in the more recent period. This means
that a standard regression not taking into account selection will produce
inconsistent wage predictions for non-working women, which shows the
relevance of incorporating selectivity in the estimation of the wage equa-
tion.
Table 4 compares predicted values from the Heckman model with an
ordinary regression model without selection adjustment. In the period
where the selection term has been found to be insigni￿cant (1975-1979),
wage predictions from the Heckman model and uncorrected OLS are
fairly similar on average. During 2000-2006, by contrast, simple regres-
sion yields predictions that are on average higher than the Heckman-
corrected estimates. Speci￿cally, wage predictions of the Heckman model
are on average about 6.87% lower than the regression-based ones. One
can also see that the regression prediction shows less variation than the
prediction based on the selection model.
38C Association matrices
Table 5 shows the association matrix S between spouses￿wage decile
positions for the period 1975-79. The association matrix for the
period 2000-06 is presented in Table 6. The relative changes of









ij , can be found in Table 1 in the main text.
husb.￿ s wife￿ s wage decile
decile 1st 2nd 3rd 4th 5th 6th 7th 8th 9th 10th
1st 1.61 1.64 1.46 0.96 0.84 0.74 0.75 0.73 0.65 0.62
2nd 1.26 1.39 1.43 0.98 0.90 0.72 0.92 1.02 0.69 0.68
3rd 1.24 1.22 1.20 0.96 0.92 0.82 0.96 1.03 0.87 0.78
4th 1.04 1.06 1.10 0.96 0.98 0.95 0.96 0.97 1.03 0.93
5th 0.99 0.95 1.01 1.00 0.97 1.07 0.99 1.03 0.96 1.04
6th 0.92 0.92 0.94 1.08 0.98 1.07 0.97 0.96 0.97 1.18
7th 0.84 0.87 0.81 1.09 1.04 1.14 0.96 1.05 1.02 1.18
8th 0.77 0.77 0.80 1.13 1.13 1.10 1.03 0.97 1.15 1.15
9th 0.72 0.66 0.70 0.97 1.11 1.25 1.14 1.06 1.20 1.19
10th 0.61 0.53 0.56 0.87 1.12 1.13 1.31 1.19 1.45 1.25
Table 5: Association Matrix S between Spousal Wages in 1975-79. (En-
tries give percentage frequencies of di⁄erent decile comibations.)
husb.￿ s wife￿ s wage decile
decile 1st 2nd 3rd 4th 5th 6th 7th 8th 9th 10th
1st 2.36 1.83 1.28 1.02 0.83 0.75 0.57 0.45 0.51 0.42
2nd 1.61 1.62 1.34 1.23 1.00 0.94 0.67 0.54 0.58 0.45
3rd 1.19 1.29 1.22 1.15 1.08 1.23 0.81 0.65 0.81 0.58
4th 1.00 1.08 1.12 1.17 0.96 1.32 1.03 0.78 0.90 0.64
5th 0.83 0.96 1.07 1.09 1.00 1.17 1.03 0.96 1.07 0.82
6th 0.78 0.84 0.98 1.02 1.03 1.11 1.05 0.96 1.28 0.95
7th 0.67 0.78 0.93 0.99 0.99 1.05 1.09 1.07 1.31 1.14
8th 0.64 0.66 0.79 0.91 0.99 0.92 1.15 1.20 1.38 1.37
9th 0.51 0.52 0.69 0.78 1.02 0.82 1.32 1.40 1.20 1.74
10th 0.43 0.43 0.59 0.64 1.09 0.69 1.28 2.00 0.96 1.90
Table 6: Association Matrix S between Spousal Wages in 2000-06. (En-
tries give percentage frequencies of di⁄erent decile comibations.)
39D Derivations and proofs
D.1 Decisions at the couple level
D.1.1 Marginal costs of home consumption
To ￿nd the marginal cost function of home consumption, we deter-
mine the cost function ￿rst. Total opportunity costs are given by
C = w1h1 +w2h2 (home production involves labor only but each spouse
faces opportunity costs of not working for pay). For the cost func-
tion, we determine the quantities h1 and h2 to produce d units of the
home good with minimal costs. This cost minimization problem yields
equivalent input combinations as the maximization of output for given
costs. The optimization problem involves the home production function
f (h1;h2) = (h1)
1=2 (h2)
1=2, time constraints h1 ￿ 1, h2 ￿ 1, and the
total cost function C = h1w1 + h2w2. When solving the problem, one
has to distinguish whether the time constraints are binding or not.
1. If time constraints are not binding, the Lagrangean reads as
L = (h1)
1=2 (h2)
1=2 + ￿[h1w1 + h2w2 ￿ C].
















￿1=2 + ￿w2 = 0





This gives a relation between both spouses￿cost-minimal labor in-
puts in home production. To determine each spouse￿ s time in home
production for a given level of home consumption d, substitute (20)





























When time constraints are not binding, total opportunity costs of
home production are thus given by














Marginal costs in this case are
MC (d) = 2(w1)
1=2 (w2)
1=2 .
2. Now we consider the case where the time constraint for the sec-












The production function in this case is
f (h1;1) = d = (h1)
1=2 :
In this range, to produce d units of the home good, the primary
earner￿ s time in home production has to be
h1 = d
2.
Total opportunity costs in this case are thus
C (d) = h1w1 + h2w2 = w1d
2 + w2
and marginal costs are
MC (d) = 2w1d.
413. When both time constraints are binding, the household can not
achieve a higher level of home consumption. The maximum level




In summary, the marginal cost function is de￿ned piecewise, see equa-
tion (8) in the main text. If time constraints are not binding, marginal
costs are constant. If the time constraint of the secondary earner binds,
marginal costs are increasing linearly. If both time constraints bind,
home production cannot be increased further.
D.1.2 Sum of the marginal rates of substitution
In general, the sum of the marginal rates of substitution will depend
on the intra-household distribution of private consumption, since the
individual MRS depend on both consumption goods. However, with log
utility (and thus linear marginal utility), the MRS can be simply added
up,










where c = c1 + c2. The sum of husband￿ s and wife￿ s MRS involves
the couple￿ s total level of market consumption c; which is given by the
di⁄erence between the couple￿ s full income and its expenditures for home
production
c = w1 + w2 ￿ C (d).
Using total costs of home consumption (9), this can be written as
c =
8
> > > <
> > > :
w1 + w2 ￿ 2 ￿ (w1)
1=2 ￿ (w2)










< d < 1
￿1; d > 1.
.
Using this expression for c, the sum of the MRS can be written as in
equation (11) in the main text.
D.1.3 Labor-supply decisions
To determine labor-supply decisions, we derive the household￿ s e¢ cient
level of home consumption which is determined by the intersection of
42equations (8) and (11). Since (8) and (11) are piecewise de￿ned func-
tions, one has to solve for the intersections of the di⁄erent parts and
check whether the intersection lies within the respective range.
1. The intersection of the ￿rst parts of (8) and (11) satis￿es:
2(w1)
1=2 (w2)
1=2 =  



































which is condition (12) from the main text. If this condition is ful-
￿lled, the couple wishes a level of home consumption which can be
produced with both spouses working less than their full time en-
dowment in home production. Then, both spouses also participate
in the labor market. If the condition is ful￿lled, the e¢ cient level
















































The remaining time is spent on market work:
n1 =1 ￿ h1 =
2
2 +  
￿
 




n2 =1 ￿ h2 =
2
2 +  
￿
 




432. If the participation condition (12) is not ful￿lled, (8) and (11)
intersect in the second part of their piecewise de￿nitions:
2w1d =  





2 +  
￿1=2




2 +  
h2 =1.
Again, the remaining time is spent on paid market work:
n1 =1 ￿ h1 =
2
2 +  
n2 =1 ￿ h2 = 0
D.2 Derivation of wives￿ hours by the husband￿ s
wage
The integrals in equation (17) evaluate as follows, yielding equation (18):
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D.3 Hump-shaped pattern of wives￿hours by the
husband￿ s wage
For 0 < ￿ < 1, the right hand side of equation (19) is a strictly concave
function of wM. Thus, when there is a local extremum, it is a maximum.
In this appendix, we show that for any combination of  , wmin, and ￿,
there is a ￿ such that nF (wM) has a local extremum in the interior of the
support of male wages. This is equivalent to the statement that, for all
marginal distributions of wages, there is a degree of assortative mating
such the pattern of wives￿hours by the husband￿ s wage is hump-shaped.
The ￿rst derivative of equation (19) is
n
0
F (wM) = ￿(1 ￿ ￿)￿
 















Since nF (wM) is concave, it is su¢ cient to show that there is a ￿
￿ such
that n0
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there is always a ￿
￿ 2 (0;1) such that (22) is ful￿lled.
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